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In recent years, countless commentators have discussed at great
length the "adversary system" of justice and the competing system of
"alternative dispute resolution." Most of these commentators, however,
have analyzed these competing systems in an intellectual vacuum. These
two systems of dispute resolution, commentators seem to suggest, are
completely unrelated to anything outside of the field of law itself. The
present analysis of the adversary system and ADR differs considerably.
First, it demonstrates that "adversary justice" and "alternative dispute
resolution" are closely related to political and economic structures in the
United States. Second, it argues that decisions about the value of these
competing systems must not be made solely in light of philosophic
principles. Rather, such decisions should be made in light of evidence
from the worlds of physical and social science.
I. INTRODUCTION
Anyone who is familiar with the literature of legal ethics knows
that a number of commentators have produced a seemingly endless supply
of analysis regarding the "adversary system of justice" and "alternatives"
to that system.' Much of that analysis, at least that directly related to the
* Associate Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School. Some of the ideas discussed
herein were also addressed in a paper that the author delivered at the 1990 Conference on
Moral Problems in the Professions. See Paul T. Wangerin, Role Differendation Problems in
Professional EIdcs, 1990 BUs. & PROF. ETHICS J. 171 (Spring-Summer 1990). Some of the
ideas discussed herein are also discussed in Paul T. Wangerin, Four Problems in Professional
Eddcs, Bus. & PROF. ETHics 1. (submitted for publication).
1. Perhaps the best concise discussion of the adversary system of justice, and
alternatives thereto, can be found in books generally dealing with legal ethics. See, e.g.,
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICs (1986); see also MICHAEL DAVIS AND
FREDERICK ELLISTON, ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1986); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD
AND WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF AWYERINO: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1987); GEOFFREY HAZARD, & DEBORAH C. RHODE, THE LEGAL
PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION (2d ed. 1988). Other brief, yet
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adversary system itself, is recounted in a recent book devoted solely to a
discussion of the adversary system of justice.2 In this book, Professor
Landsman notes that this system has three distinguishing characteristics.
First, this system requires neutral and passive decision makers, usually
comprehensive discussions of these topics can be found in texts on civil procedure. See,
e.g., FLEMING JAMES, JR. AND GEOFFREY HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.2 (3d ed. 1985).
For some of the most widely discussed articles on these topics, particularly the adversary
system of justice, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 56-60 (1974); A. Sherman Christensen, Some Reflections on the Nature of the Future
of the Adversary System, 30 DEF. L. J. 325 (1981); Charles P. Curtis, 7he Ethics of
Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1951); Henry S. Drinker, Some Remarks on Mr. Curtis' "The
Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 349 (1952) (Drinker was one of the first writers
systematically to study the field of legal ethics in America.); Monroe H. Freedman,
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions,
64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L. J. 1060 (1976); Lon L. Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978); Lon L. Fuller & John D.
Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference: Professional Responsi-
bility, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160-61 (1958); John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal
Defense - New Answers to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1980); John T. Noonan,
Jr., The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485
(1966); Kenneth L. Penegar, The Five Pillars of Professionalism, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 307
(1988); Stephen L. Pepper, 7he Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem and
Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (1986); Gerald J. Postema, Moral
Responsibility and Professional Ethic, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63 (1980); Murray L. Schwartz,
The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543; William H. Simon, The
Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIs. L. REV. 29;
Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975);
James B. White, The Ethics of Argument: Plato's Gorgias and the Modem Lawyer, 50 U.
CI. L. REv. 849 (1983). For additional recent discussions, see Monroe H. Freedman,
Client Confidences and Client Perjury: Some Unanswered Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
1939 (1988); RJ. Gerber, ictory vs. Truth: The Adversary System and its Ethics, 19 ARIZ.
ST. LJ. 3 (1987); Michael K. McChrystal, Lawyers and Loyalty, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV.
367 (1992); George Rutherglen, Dilemmas and Disclosures: A Comment on Client Perjury,
18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 319 (1991); Stephen A. Salzburg, Lawyers, Clients, and the Adversary
System, 37 MERCER L. REV. 647 (1986); Ted Schneyer, Uniting the Balkans: Wolfram on
Legal Ethics, 37 J. LEG. EDUC. 434 (1987); Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's Mission:
Reflections on the Rlght to Present a False Case, 1 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125 (1987).
Several other comprehensive works cite much additional literature on the
adversary system. See Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Trial, 78 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118 (1987); Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System Advantage
and Effective Assistance of Council in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOC. POL'Y
59 (1986); see also FREDERICK A. E.LISTON & JAN VAN SCHAiCK, LEGAL ETHICS: AN
ANNOTATED BIBLIOCRAPHY AND RESOURCE GUIDE (1984); Erwin Chereminky, Pedagogy
Without Purpose: An Essay on Professional Responsibility Courses and Case Books, 1985
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 189.
2. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN
APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION (1988) [hereinafter READINGS].
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judges or jurors.' Second, the adversary system of justice requires party
presentation of evidence in a competitive setting.4 In other words, parties
or lawyers present conflicting versions of the facts and the law. Finally,
the adversary system of justice involves highly structured forensic
procedures.- These highly structured procedures are necessary,
Landsman suggests, because "adversary procedure exacerbates the natural
tendency of advocates to seek to win by any means available."'
Countless criticisms and defenses of the adversary system of
justice exist.' Again, thankfully, Landsman provides an exhaustive
summary of these criticisms and defenses.' The adversary system, many
critics have noted, is slow to operate and displays a seeming lack of
interest in discovering material truth. Furthermore, access to the system
by anyone except the wealthy is difficult, and the system exacerbates the
power of lawyers and the conflicting responsibilities of judges.
Conversely, many writers argue that the system has considerable strong
points, points that can perhaps best be discussed in terms of what are
sometimes called "consequentialist" and "non-consequentialist" defenses.
Consequentialist defenses of the adversary system are defenses that rely
upon claims that the adversary system best accomplishes the kinds of




6. Professor Wolfram provides a similar, albeit different list of attributes of the
adversary system, as do countless other writers. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHIcs § 10.1 (1986).
7. LANDSMAN, READINGS, supra note 2, at 4-5. Countless criticisms and defenses of
the adversary system of justice have been put forward. Thankfully, however, Landsman
provides an exhaustive summary of these criticisms and defenses. A similar exhaustive
discussion of these criticisms and defenses has also been provided by David Luban. DAVID
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY, 67-103 (1988). The adversary
system is slow to operate, some critics suggest, and displays a seeming lack of interest in
discovering material truth. Further, other critics argue that access to the system by anyone
except the wealthy is difficult, and that the system exacerbates the power of lawyers and the
conflicting responsibilities of judges. Defenders of this system, however, counter with two
different kinds of arguments. Some defenders put forward "consequentialist" defenses of this
system, defenses that rest upon claims that this system best accomplishes the kinds of things
that lawyers are called upon to do. The adversary system, these consequentialist defenders
claim, is the best way to produce truth, or that it is the best way to defend legal rights. See
id. at 68, 74. Other defenders of the adversary system advance "non-consequentialist"
defenses, defenses that do not look to the consequences produced by use of the system. The
adversary system is intrinsically good, some non-consequentialists argue. Id. at 83. Others
suggest that this system is most consistent with human dignity. Id. at 85.
8. THE GOOD LAWYER 67-103 (David Luban ed., 1984).
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produce truth,9 for example, or that it is the best way to defend legal
rights.1 Non-consequentialist defenses, in turn, are defenses that do not
look to the things actually accomplished by the system. Rather, these
defenses concentrate on the underlying nature of the system itself. That
the system is intrinsically good might be one non-consequentialist
defense of the adversary system, as might be an argument that the
adversary system is the "dispute resolution system" most consistent with
human dignity.' Another non-consequentialist defense of the adversary
system is that the system is, somehow, an integral part of the social fabric
of Anglo-American society.'
A critically important point must now be made. Given the
breadth of analysis just described, and the number of citations already
provided, it hardly seems possible for anybody to say anything new about
this topic. Therefore, anybody contemplating yet another discussion of
this topic perhaps should think about Winston Churchill's advice about
physical exercise. Whenever he felt the desire to exercise, Churchill
noted, he would simply lie down until that desire went away.
Interestingly, however, one somewhat new point in this context can be
explored further. This point has been hinted at repeatedly in connection
with discussions of the adversary system and its alternatives but has been
quickly dismissed before it could be developed fully.
II. THE ROOTS OF THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM OF JUSTICE
Numerous commentators on the history of the adversary system of
justice have noted that the present-day adversary system is not nearly as
ancient as it is usually thought to be."' Rather, what we now know as
9. Id. at 68.
10. Id. at 74.
11. Id. at 83.
12. Id. at 85.
13. THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 8, at 87.
14. For elaborate discussions of the history of the adversary system of justice, see
STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1984); ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE
696-703 (1959); Stephan Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System and the Changing
Role of the Advocate in That System, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 25 (1981) [hereinafter
Landsman, Decline of the Adversary System]; David Luban, Cahning the Hearse Horse, 40
MD. L. REV. 451 (1981); Robert W. Millar, The Formative Principles of Civil Procedure, 18
ILL. L. REV. 1 (1923); Stuart Neef & Marian Nagel, The Adversary Nature of the American
Legal System from a Historical Perspective, 20 N.Y.L. F. 123 (1972); Noonan, supra note 1;
Penegar, supra note 1; Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law, 5 CoLUM. L. REv.
339 (1905); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L.
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the adversary system was preceded by what Landsman calls "pre-
adversarial" dispute resolution procedures.' In earliest times, disputes
were resolved through a process called "trial by battle."1' People
themselves, or the "champions" that individual people employed, literally
fought things out in formalized settings. As society itself became less
violent, however, trial by battle was replaced by "trial by ordeal." 1  In
trial by ordeal, people prevailed by establishing that they could withstand
physical pressure, or even torture. Eventually, however, words replaced
force in connection with the resolution of disputes. Further, and perhaps
more significantly, informal dispute resolution, often under the auspices of
important people in the community, gradually became an important dispute
resolution technique.' Thus, gradually, people started to argue things
out rather than fight. Finally, juries appeared, first connected to the
parties themselves and then independently of the parties."
Adversarial proceedings themselves did not fully develop until the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Europe.' Landsman notes
that the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe were times of
"intense social and economic ferment."' Dramatic calls for fundamental
changes in the organization of society itself were continuously made.'
Landsman then makes a cryptic point: "The special needs of eighteenth
and nineteenth century society accentuated the adversarial aspects of
Anglo-American judicial procedure. "w
REV. 494 (1986); Showell Rogers, The Ethics of Advocacy, 15 LAW. Q. REV. 259 (1899).
See also PAUL BRAND, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFESSION (1992) (discussing
very early days of Western legal system in Europe); KENNETH KIPNIS, LEGAL ETHICS
(1986); Edmund Byrne, The Adversary System: Who Needs It?, 6 AM. LEGAL STUD. ASS'N
F. 1 (1982); William C. Heffernan, The Moral Accountability of Advocates, 61 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 36 (1985); John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A
View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1983).
15. LANDSMAN, READINGS, supra note 2.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Mediation, according to Professor Becker, who relies upon the work of Professor
Auerbach, was the major, if not dominant form of dispute resolution in seventeenth century
America. Theodore Becker, Conflict and Paradox: The New American Mediation
Movement: Status Quo and Social Transfonnation, 1986 MIss. J. DiSp. RES. 109, 111.
19. LANDSMAN, READINGS, supra note 2.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 19.
22. Id.
23. Id. Landsman briefly returns to this same point later in his book when he describes
a number of recent "non-adversarial reforms* in the American legal system. Id. at 21. In a
number of settings, he notes, courts in the United States have abandoned adversarial
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Interestingly, a number of commentators other than Landsman
have hinted at the possible importance of the precise time at which
adversarial procedures as they now exist finally developed. These
commentators briefly suggest that dispute resolution systems in a society
almost certainly reflect larger aspects of the society generally' Several
commentators, for example, have explicitly noted that a connection might
exist between the adversary system of justice and the principles of laissez-
faire economics, principles that flourished in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries in Europe.' Other commentators have at least hinted at this
techniques. "This trend," he continues, "did not begin recently. It has grown out of social
and economic forces that have been building for a long time." Id. Landsman provides only
the briefest explanation of what those societal forces are. "The individualistic adversarial
approach is," he suggests, "to a significant degree, inconsistent with what Max Weber has
described as the fundamental requirement of modem 'bureaucratic' government and industry.
.. " Id.
24. See, e.g., JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE LrTIoious SOCIETY 168-71 (1981); Richard
L. Abel, A Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in Society, 8 L. & SoC'Y REV. 217,
287, 297-300 (1973); Miijan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models
of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 569-70 (1973);
Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATURE
257, 257-62 (1986); Jane Mansbridge, Living with Conflict: Representation in the Theory of
Adversary Democracy, 91 ETHICS 466, 469 (1981); Pound, supra note 14, at 344-49; Resnik,
supra note 14, at 502-07, 517-19, 540-41; Maurice Rosenberg, Can Court-Related
Alternatives Improve Our Dispute Resolution System?, 69 JUDICATURE 254, 254 (1986);
Simon, supra note 1, at 62-72.
25. Marvin Frankel, for example, makes this point briefly, but quite explicitly, on a
number of occasions. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 10, 17-18 (1980); Marvin
Frankel, From Private Rights Toward Public Justice, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 516, 516 (1976);
Marvin Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1036-
37 (1975). Jerome Frank also makes this point explicitly, but again only briefly. JEROME
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 19-20, 92 (1949); see also Owen M. Fiss, 7he Social and
Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 123-24 (1982).
Professor Kutak seems to develop this point most fully. Robert J. Kutak, The
Adversary System and the Practice of Law, in THE GOOD LAwYER 172-87 (David Luban ed.,
1983). Kutak describes what he refers to as a 'competitive model" of adjudication. He
concludes this discussion by suggesting that his model explains the most troubling aspect of
the adversarial system, namely that lawyers involved in the system generally are thought not
to have any moral responsibility personally to seek truth and justice.
A fundamental characteristic of the competitive theory is that competing
individuals have no legal responsibility for the competence of their
counterparts on the other side of the transaction and, consequently,
have no obligation to share the benefits of their own competence with
the other side.
Id. at 174.
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connection.' In addition, several commentators have alluded to the fact
that a connection might exist between the adversary system of justice and
ideas about "checks and balances" that flourished in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries." Finally, a number of commentators have hinted
that the adversary system of justice is somehow related to the general
Then Kutak makes an important observation. It is understood that, while the competitive
process may produce more correct economic, political, moral or judicial results, it will not in
every instance guarantee a correct result or in every case advance the common interest.
Because individual competencies in employing a given process may vary, bad products will
sometimes prevail over good products in the marketplace; bad ideas will sometimes prevail
over good ideas in the public forum; and bad persons will sometimes prevail over good
persons in the judicial process. Id.
26. See, e.g., Edmund Byrne, The Adversary System: Who Needs It?, in ETHICS IN
THE LEGAL PROFESION 185, 213 (Michael Davis et al. eds., 1984); ALAN DERsHowrrz,
THE BEST DEFENSE xviii (1982); MARC A. FRANKLIN, BIOGRAPHY OF A LEGAL DISPUTE 94
(1968); GEOFFREY HAZARD & JAN VETrER, PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 152 (1987)
(referring to notion of "self-interest"); KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE
CHEYENE WAY (1941) (self-interest); David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE
GOOD LAWYER 83, 100-02 (David Luban ed., 1984); THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE
COURTS AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION GATHERING IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 24-25
(1978) (self-interest); Stuart Neef & Marian Nagel, The Adversarial Nature of the American
Legal System: A Historical Perspective, in LAWYER ETHICS 83-87 (Allan Gerson ed., 1980);
RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 492-93 (1986); ANNE STRICK,
INJUSTICE FOR ALL 87 (1977); LLOYD WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 109 (1977) (invisible
hand); Geoffrey F. Aronow, The Special Master in School Desegregation Cases: The
Evolution of Roles in the Reformation of Public Institutions Through Litigation, 7 HASTINGS
CONST. L. Q. 739, 748 (1986); Barbara A. Babcock, Fair Play, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133
(1982); Edward F. Barrett, The Adversary System and the Ethics of Advocacy, 37 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 479, 481 (1962); Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in the Pre-Trial
Development of Big Cases, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 287, 370; Robert A. Burt, Conflict
and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEo. L.J. 1015, 1024 (1981); Abram Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1285-86 (1976);
Anthony D'Amato & Edward J. Eberle, Three Models of Legal Ethics, 27 ST. LOUIS U. LJ.
761, 769-70 (1983); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073, 1077 (1984);
Fiss, supra note 25, at 127-28; Fuller & Randall, supra note 1, at 1160-61; Landsman,
Decline of the Adversary System, supra note 14, at 254. Penegar, supra note 1, at 311.
Judith Resnik, 2ers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 840, 847 (1984) (self-interest); Deborah L. Rhode,
Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. Rev. 589, 595 (1985) (free market
conception of adjudicative processes); Timothy Wilton, Functional Interest Advocacy in
Modern Complex Litigation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 37, 40 (1982) (self-interest).
27. See Louis D. Brandeis, 7he Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS: A PROFESSION
(1914); Alan Donagan, Justfying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in THE GOOD
LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS (David Luban ed., 1983); Galanter,
supra note 24; David Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse, 40 MD. L. REV. 451, 468 (1981);
Mansbridge, supra note 24, at 469; Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a
System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1293, 1296 (1987); Douglas Wells,
Towards a Kinder, Gentler, Legal Profession: A Conunentary on Professor Stephen Pepper's
"Autonomy, Community, and Lawyers' Ethics," 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 967, 970 (1990).
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notion of "individualism. " 2s  Again, the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries in Europe and America were the time and place during which
notions of individualism achieved great prominence.
Regrettably, no one to date has examined these connections in
detail. Thus no one has shown just how closely the adversary system of
justice is linked to important ideas about economics and politics in
American society.
II. Two "MODELS" FOR SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
In recent years, it has become increasingly clear to those who
study western culture that competing conceptions regarding the nature of
human beings and the social institutions they form have vied for
dominance for thousands of years. These notions can be described
respectively as "civic humanism" and "classical liberalism. "'
A. Civic Humanism
Aristotle and Plato, both claiming to be scientists as well as
philosophers,'e believed that the record of science demonstrates that
human beings are intrinsically cooperative, communitarian, and
altruistic."1 This optimistic conclusion about human nature, a conclusion
that is often associated with a set of ideas called "civic humanism,"
dominated Western thought for thousands of years.3 2  Christian
28. See Stuart Neef & Marian Nagel, The Adversarial Nature of the American Legal
System: A Historical Perspective, in LAWYER ETHICs 83 (Allan Gerson ed., 1980);
Badcock, supra note 26, at 1138-40; Burt, supra note 26, at 1024, 1041; Owen M. Fiss, The
Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 43 (1979); Pound, supra note 14, at 344-46; Resnik,
supra note 26, at 845.
29. The following analysis draws heavily on Paul T. Wangerin, Four Problems in
Professional Ethics, Bus. & PROF. ETHICs 1. (submitted for publication).
30. ROGER MASTERs, THE NATURE OF POUTICS xi (1989).
31. FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLEcTrUAL ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTrUTION 109, 189 (1985).
32. Another name for this underlying notion is 'republicanism." What were called
republican ideas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries would today probably be called
"liberal" ideas. (Conversely, of course, ideas described as liberal in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries would today probably be identified as conservative.) Carter Braxton, a
signer of the Declaration of Independence and a harsh critic of the tradition of civic
humanism, perhaps described that tradition best. To republican ideologues, Braxton wrote:
Public virtue means a disinterested attachment to the public good,
exclusive and independent of all private and selfish interest. A man,
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philosophers, for example, at least early ones, subscribed to this optimistic
perspective, as did most Medieval thinkers in Western society. Hegel
later supported this notion.' Even Rousseau, at least in connection with
some of his thinking, believed that human beings were not entirely
egoistic.' Finally, the socialist thinkers s most notably Marx,' were
therefore, to qualify himself for a member of such a community . . .
must not, through ambition, desire to be great, because it would destroy
that equality upon which the security of the government depends; nor
ought he to be rich, lest he be tempted to indulge himself in those
luxuries, which, though lawful, are not expedient, and might occasion
envy and emulation.
MCDONALD, supra note 31, at 88.
33. MAsTERs, supra note 30, at 3.
34. Id. at 177-80. Although Rousseau did not believe that human being in the state of
nature were particularly social. Nevertheless, he also did not believe that they were the
egotistic, self-interested individuals that Hobbes, Smith, and Antiphon the Sophist thought
them to be. Forjuxtaposition of Hobbes' ideas and Rousseau's, see BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE
BATTLE FOR HUMAN NATURE: SCIENCE, MORALTY AND MODERN LIFE 42-43 (1986).
35. Interestingly, Marxists, and radical thinkers following in the state of nature tradition
of Rousseau, were not the only people who doubted that human beings were, by nature,
competitive and self interested. Indeed, one of the most powerful early twentieth century
attacks on the supposed value of competition came from a surprising direction. In 1923,
Frank Knight, one of the early twentieth century's most prominent supporters of capitalist
orthodoxy, published a stunning attack on the idea of competition. FRANK H. KNIGHT, THE
ETHICS OF COMPETITION AND OTHER ESSAYS (1935). "We appear to search in vain," Knight
wrote, "for any really ethical basis for competition as a basis for an ideal type of human
relation, or as a motive to action."
[Competition] fails to harmonize either with the Pagan ideal of society
as a community of friends or the Christian ideal of spiritual fellowship.
Its only justification is that it is effective in getting things done; but any
candid answer to the question, 'what things,' compels the admission
that they leave much to be desired. Whether for good or bad, its
aesthetic ideals are not such as command the approval of the most
competent judges, and as for spirituality, commercialism is in a fair
way to make that term incomprehensible to living men. The motive
itself has been generally condemned by the best spirits of the race.
Id. at 37-38.
36. Regrettably, most discussions of Marx's work are extremely one sided, being either
violently pro or violently con. However, some balanced discussions exists. For a readable
discussion, see ROBERT HEILBRONER, MARXISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1980). Joseph
Schumpeter also provides enormous insight into Marx's work, strongly critical but at the
same time enormously respectful. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITAuSM, SOCIAUISM AND
DEMOCRACY 1, 58 (1947). For another very interesting and balanced treatment of Marx
work, particularly in contrast to traditional eighteenth and nineteenth century liberalism, see
ELLEN F. PAUL El AL., MARXISM AND LIBERAusM (1986). See also DAVID BRAYBROOKE,
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the most important modem proponents of the optimistic perspective on
human nature. Science itself demonstrates, Marx argued, that human
beings are not "isolated atoms in society."37 Rather, science shows that
human beings are an ensemble of social relations.' These scientific
facts, Marx concluded, should compel societies to create social institutions
that rest on communitarian rather than individialistic ideals"
It must now most forcefully be noted that many modem people
who do not subscribe to Marx's specific ideas about politics and
economics still share with Marx - and Hegel and Rousseau and the
Christian philosophers - the general civic humanism perspective regarding
human nature itself. This is so, of course, because civic humanism merely
requires proponents to believe: (1) that human beings are, by nature,
cooperative and altruistic, (2) that human beings do not act ethically if
they put their own interests wholly ahead of the interests of others, and (3)
that social institutions should reflect the altruistic and cooperative nature of
human beings.
40
It is hardly necessary to say that the notion of civic humanism and
its underlying ideas present an extremely attractive model for human
society. Obviously, cooperation is a good thing among people, and
something to be encouraged. Altruism is also a good thing and should be
encouraged. Not surprisingly, many modem commentators on various
aspects of professional ethics advance arguments that rest, in effect, on the
tenets of civic humanism. For example, many modem commentators on
business ethics argue that business people have "social responsibilities,"
which make them responsible to the general public as well as to the
ETHICS IN THE WORLD OF BUSINEss (1983). Braybrooke reprints an important fragment
from Marx's notebooks on "Free Human Production," a fragment that perhaps best explains
Marx's moral objections to market economics. Id. at 24. Interestingly, Braybrooke
juxtaposes this passage from Marx against Frank Knight's classic free market attack on the
competitive ideology. Id. at 27; see also Morris, Book Review, 2 BUs. & PROF. ETHICS J.
3, 69 (1983).
37. HEILBRONER, supra note 36, at 160.
38. Id. Marx perhaps best captured the essence of his ideas about the cooperative
nature of human beings in a metaphors, surprisingly, about bees. "A spider conducts
operations that resemble those of a weaver," Marx wrote, "and a bee puts to shame many an
architect in the construction of its cells." Id. at 149.
But what distinguishes the worst of the architects from the best of the
bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before
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businesses they represent.' These commentators insist that the search
for profits must not take precedence over everything else. In addition,
many modem commentators on political ethics argue that politicians and
other government officials must consider the public interest as well as their
own private interest.' Anything else, these writers suggest, is unethical.
41. An enormous amount of writing has been done in recent years on the topic of what
is generally called "corporate social responsibility.' Most of this writing suggests that
business people indeed do have social responsibilities. For recent discussions, see R.
EDwARD FREEMAN & DAVID GILBERT, CORPORATE STRATEGY AND THE SEARCH FOR
ETHICS 88-106 (1988); ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF COMPETITIVE
MANAGERS 199-204 (1988). One book deals exclusively with this subject. RICHARD N.
FARMER, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed. 1985). For the best introductions to
this whole area, see THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY 59-108 (1982);
PATRICIA WERHANE & KENDALL D'ANDRADE, PROFIT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES IN
BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1985). For provocative discussions, see TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP & NORMAN E. BOWIE, ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 52-127 (2d ed. 1983)
(Beauchamp and Bowie are well known writers in the field of business ethics.); JACK N.
BEHRMAN, DISCOURSES ON ETHICS AND BUSINESS 67-78, 95-158 (1981) (a particularly
interesting discussion). Many other related works are noted in an extensive bibliography of
business ethics. A BIBIOGRAPHY OF BUSINESS ETHICS 1981-85 (Donald Jones & Patricia
Bennett eds., 1986).
An important distinction in the terminology of business ethics must now be noted.
Socially 'responsive' businesses are not necessarily socially 'responsible." Many business
people and corporations, responding to social pressure, contribute large sums of money to
charitable organizations or other not-for-profit entities. Furthermore, many business people
and corporations, responding to social pressure, recall from sale products that have generated
poor publicity, even if no enforceable statute or regulation requires that recall. Most of the
time, however, business people and corporations do these things because they realize that
long term goals and profits can be jeopardized by failure to act in ways that are consistent
with the public's expectations. In short, they are not motivated by a sense of social
responsibility, but by the realization that their long term best interests are best served by
doing what may be socially responsible. Yet, corporate social responsibility does occur when
businesses engage in some kind of act purely for altruistic reasons, and self-interest is not a
factor. For example, a socially "responsible" business person might voluntarily stop
operating a polluting factory simply because that business person believes in keeping the
natural environment as pure as possible.
42. Again, the general literature on the ethical responsibilities of public officials is
immense. Ostrum and Chandler, however, are perhaps the most important writers on the
subject generally of political ethics. See, e.g., Ralph C. Chandler, Dealing with Ethical
Issues and Value Conflicts, In MANAGING PUBLIC PROGRAMS: BALANCING POLITICS,
ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC NEEDS 102-20 (Robert E. Cleary & Nicholas Henry eds.,
1989); VINCENT OSTRUM, THE INTELLECTUAL CRISIS IN AMERICAN PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION 116-138 (1989); see also KATHRYN G. DENHARDT, THE ETHICS OF PUBLIC
SERVICE: RESOLVING MORAL DILEMMAS IN PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS, (1988); BRUCE
JENNINGS & DANIEL CALLAHAN, REPRESENTATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: EXPLORING
LEGISLATIVE ETHICS (1985); DANIEL MARTIN, THE GUIDE TO THE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION (1989); Public Adnministraton: Past, Present and Future Paradigms, in
PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT 247-60 (Marcia Lynn Whicker & Todd W. Arenson eds.,
, 213
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Finally, many modem commentators on legal ethics suggest that the
lawyers in an adversarial system must consider not only their clients'
interests,' but also the public good. Thus, lawyers act ethically only if
they consider both the public good and the good of their clients.
Attractive as the notions of civic humanism are, and attractive as
the social institutions built on those notions are, one factor could wreak
havoc in this context. Social institutions built on the notion of civic
1990).
43. For some of the most widely quoted discussions of the adversary system of justice,
and some of the discussions that most significantly influenced the present writer, see
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 56-60
(1974); Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REv. 3, 16 (1951); Henry S.
Drinker, Some Remarks on Mr. Curtis' "The Ethics of Advocacy,' 4 STAN. L. REV. 349
(1952) (Drinker was one of the first writers systematically to study the field of legal ethics in
America.); Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966); Charles Fried, The
Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L. J.
1060 (1976); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353
(1978); Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161-62 (1958); John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the
Criminal Defense Attorney, 32 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1980); John T. Noonan, The Purposes of
Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1966); Gerald 3.
Postema, Moral Responsibility and Professional Ethic, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63 (1980);
Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, A. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543 (1983);
William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, 1978 WIS. L. REV 29; Richard Wasserstrom,
Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. BULL. 1 (1975); James Boyd
White, The Ethics of Argument: Plato's Gorgias and the Modern Lawyer, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 849 (1983). For additional recent discussions, see R.J. Gerber, Victory vs. Truth: The
Adversary System and its Ethics, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3 (1987); Stephen L. Pepper, The
Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (1986); Harry I. Subin,
The Criminal Lawyer's Difficult Mission: The 'Right' to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 125 (1987). None of these works have any systematic discussions of the
adversary system in relation to things other than the work of law and lawyers.
For recent books on legal ethics, see MICHAEL DAVIS & FREDERICK A. ELLISTON,
ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1986) (a book of readings), GEOFFREY C. HAZARD &
WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (supp. 1987) (a practitioner's guide), GEOFFREY. C. HAZARD, JR.
& DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION (2d
d. 1988); C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (1986). For two interesting reference
tools on legal ethics, see FREDERICK A. ELLISTON & JANE VAN SCHAICK, LEGAL ETHICS:
AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND RESOURCE GUIDE (1984); Erwin Chereminsky,
Pedagogy Without Purpose: An Essay on Professional Responsibility Courses and Case
Books, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 189.
In two recent comprehensive essays, Dean Goodpaster cites much of the rest of
the literature on ethics in the adversary system. See Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of
American Adversary Trial, 78 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 118 (1987); Gary Goodpaster,
The Adversary System Advantage and Effective Assistance of Council in Criminal Cases, 14
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. POLICY 59 (1986).
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humanism will only work if human beings actually are cooperative and
altruistic by nature. However, if human beings actually are competitive
and self-interested by nature, then such social institutions simply cannot
work.
B. Classical Liberalism
As noted earlier, Masters recently demonstrated that the Western
philosophic tradition has been dominated for most of the last 2,000 years
by people who believe that human beings are, by nature, altruistic and
cooperative, in other words by pronouncements of what herein is called
civic humanism.' Admittedly, ancients like Antiphon the Sophist
disagreed.' For the most part, however, a consensus on this point
existed until the seventeenth century.
The seventeenth century, and the two centuries that followed,
brought a major change in attitude. First, Thomas Hobbes shocked
Europe in the seventeenth century by insisting that the ancients and
Medieval philosophers had been mistaken in their "scientific" views of
human nature." According to Hobbes, science demonstrates that human
44. MASTERS, supra note 30.
45. See ROGER D. MASTERS, THE NATURE OF POuTICS 3 (1989). Masters quotes
Antiphon the Sophist, as follows:
Men draw life from the things that are advantageous to them: they
incur death from the things that are disadvantageous to them. But the
things which are established as advantageous in the view of the law are
restraints on nature, whereas the things established by nature as
advantageous are free. Therefore, things that cause pain do not, on a
right view, benefit nature more than things that cause pleasure; and
therefore, again, things which cause suffering would not be more
advantageous than things which cause happiness - for things which are
really [truly or in truth] advantageous ought not to cause detriment, but
gain .... Take the case of those who retaliate only after suffering
injury, and are never themselves the aggressors; or those who behave
well to their parents, though their parents behave badly to them; or
those, again, who allow others to prefer charges on oath, and bring no
such charges themselves. Of the actions here mentioned one would find
many to be inimical to nature. They involve more suffering when less
is possible, less pleasure when more is possible and injury when
freedom from injury is possible.
Id. at 3-4.
46. For a discussion of Hobbes' work, see FRANK M. COLEMAN, HOBBES AND
AMERICA: EXPLORING THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION (1977) and MILTON MYERS, THE
SOUL OF MODERN ECONOMIC MAN (1983). Myers explores how Hobbes' ideas gradually
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beings are intrinsically competitive and self-interested.47 Second, and
more significantly, eighteenth and nineteenth century philosophers created
the notion of "classical liberalism," a notion whose underlying tenets are
diametrically opposed to the tenets of civic humanism.'
Classical liberalism, Lodge notes in his important discussion of
professional ethics, rests on five Lockean principles, all five of which
differ markedly from those that controlled prior to Locke's time.' First,
Lodge notes that everything about Lockean liberalism emphasizes
individualism. Individual rights, Locke argued, necessarily must take
precedence over group rights.' Second, Lodge suggests that eighteenth
and nineteenth century Lockean liberalism sanctified property rights.'M
Because property rights established a clear demarcation between the
individual and the community as a whole, such rights provide strong
support for individual rights. Third, whereas Medieval philosophers
expected people generally to cooperate with each other, Locke and his
followers thought that competition between people would be the norm.'M
evolved into Smith's ideas. See also MASTERS, supra note 30, at 295.
47. The concept of self-interest itself, of course, is not a simple one. Indeed, Schwartz
recently put forward three distinct definitions of self-interestedness. The first definition,
which is close to the beliefs of Hobbes, describes human beings as always interested only in
themselves. The second definition, which, as will be demonstrated below, is close to the
views of Adam Smith, describes human beings as selfish in extreme situations but at least
capable of altruism. Finally, a third definition, which is close to the views of Rousseau,
describes human beings as altruistic by nature but selfish because of corrupting economic and
cultural institutions. SCHWARTz, supra note 34, at 49-50.
48. Classical liberalism seems in significant part to have been an attempt by eighteenth
and nineteenth century Western philosophers to create a theory that could bring together
Hobbes' 'scientific" observation about the underlying self-interestedness of human beings and
the idea of democracy. Classical liberalism postulated, in short, that self-interested human
beings could in fact live together without the need for an all-powerful ruler or state.
The modem term "liberalism," of course, has a completely different meaning than
the term classical liberalisib. Indeed classical liberalism is probably more closely aligned
with what now would be called "conservatism" than with what now is called liberalism.
49. George Cabot Lodge, Managerial Implications of Ideological Change, in THE
ETHICS OF CORPORATE CONDUCT, 79-105 (Clarence C. Walton ed., 1977).
50. Id. at 85.
51. Id.
52. Id. Antonio Jorge develops this point further in a book written for business
educators. ANTONIO JORGE, COMPETITION, COOPERATION, EFFICIENCY AND SOCIAL
OROANIZATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL ECONOMICS (1978). "Competition and
cooperation," he argues, 'constitute antithetical approaches to human institutions." Id. at 13.
More significantly, Jorge, reflecting Lockean principles, suggests that these two ideas
represent the "most basic general categories of motivation that are found in social life." Id.
Social, political and economic structures are all ultimately characterized
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by a specific vision of the kind of relationship that exists or ideally
should exist among the human agents that actuate them ...
Competitive and cooperative motivations transcend or transform formal
organization structures, regardless of how they came about historically.
At the end, human motivations emerge, albeit gradually and
laboriously, as the shaping force of history and social life.
Id. at 15. Jorge returns to this same theme later in his book and makes an even more
startling point.
It is unquestionable that the basic philosophical and ethiocultural
heritage of the West is built on and around the individual. The relevant
unit of value, thought and action has always, in the Western context,
been the individual person. This typically Western mental approach to
man and society permeates and invariably influences all aspects of life
and culture in Occidental nations. . . . It would seem that such
foundations are indestructible, short of the cultural annihilation of the
Western type of human being and the basic traits of Western mentality.
Id. at 66-67. Jorge and Lodge are not the only writers on business ethics topics that have
discussed these two competing ideas. See, e.g., SAMUEL M. NATALE, ETHICS AND MORALS
IN BUSINESS 39-49 (1983). Natale discusses much of the literature on competition and
cooperation. Id. at 44-50. See also MARSHALL MISSNER, ETHICS OF THE BUSINESS SYSTEM
69-139 (1980) (a group of essays on competition and cooperation). For an interesting pair of
essays taking conflicting points of view on the issues of cooperation and competition, see
both FRANK KNIGHT, ETHICS OF COMPETITION AND OTHER ESSAYS (1935) and Georg
Sinimel, 7he Socializing and Civilizing Function of Competition, in CONFLICT: THE WEB OF
GROUP AFFILIATION (1955). Excerpts from both essays are provided in BRAYBROOKE, supra
note 36, at 27, 43.
Several writers on legal issues have also discussed these two concepts at
considerable length. Unfortunately, these writers cite each others' work and certainly do not
cite work done by writers on business ethics. For example, shortly before his death, Robert
Kutak, the Chair of the American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards and the driving force behind the American Bar Association's relatively recent
"Model Rules of Professional Responsibility," argued that the adversarial system of justice
rests fundamentally upon certain underlying perceptions about human nature. Kutak, supra
note 25, at 172-87. The basic premise of virtually all [our] institutions is that open and
relatively unrestrained competition among individuals produces the maximum collective good.
That idea permeates all aspects of American life, and accordingly, is given effect by law
governing the conduct of individuals and the state.' Id. at 173-74.
Another example of a discussion of the ideas of competition and cooperation can
be found in Gerald R. Williams' widely read book, Legal Negotiation and Settlement, where
Williams suggests that empirical evidence demonstrates that two completely distinct styles of
negotiating exist. GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (1983).
One of those styles, according to Williams, is competitive; the other style is cooperative.
Successful competitive negotiators, Williams argues, have goals that differ significantly from
the goals of cooperative negotiators. Id. at 23. Competitive negotiators seek to maximize
settlement for the client. Id. Furthermore, they try to obtain a profitable fee for themselves.
Id. Finally, they attempt to outdo or out-maneuver the opponent. Id. Conversely,
successful cooperative negotiators have completely different goals. Id. at 20. Although these
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The fourth and fifth Lockean principles that serve as the
foundation for classical liberalism break sharply from the ideas of Hobbes
and, in a dramatic way, prefigure the ideas of Adam Smith.' Locke
argued for a government with dramatically limited power. (Hobbes, it
should be recalled, argued that a sovereign with unlimited powers was
necessary.) Locke thought limitations on the power of governments were
necessary because powerful states inevitably curtail individual rights."'
Finally, Locke and his followers argued that specialization and
fragmentation should be encouraged.ss In Locke's view, specialization
and fragmentation foster individualism. In addition, specialization and
fragmentation reflect the fact that different people do not always share
beliefs and goals.'
Adam Smith dramatically expanded the scope of Locke's ideas,
and thus the notion of classical liberalism.' Like Hobbes, Smith
negotiators seek to maximize settlement for the client and otherwise meet the client's needs,
these negotiators also wish to conduct themselves ethically. Id. Furthermore, they seek to
get what they call a "fair" settlement, a settlement that does not necessarily make them a
winner and the other side a loser. Id. Finally, cooperative negotiators seek to maintain or
establish a good personal relationship with their opponent. Id.
After reviewing all of his data, Williams concluded that competitive and
cooperative styles of negotiation can be equally effective. Id. at 25. Skilled competitive
negotiators, he suggests, are just as likely to obtain favorable results for their clients as
skilled cooperative negotiators, and vice versa. Id. Furthermore, unskilled cooperative
negotiators are just as likely to obtain unfavorable results for their clients as unskilled
competitive negotiators. Id. at 35. In short, according to Williams, neither style of
negotiation should be favored. Id. at 41.
53. Lodge, supra note 49, at 85.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Clarence Walton, in his book The Ethics of Corporate Conduct, put Locke's ideas
into graphic form. See Clarence Walton, Overview, in THE ETHICS OF CORPORATE
CONDUCT (Clarence Walton, ed. 1977). Walton contrasts what he calls the "classical world
view* with what he calls the "modem world view." (The classical world, in this
terminology, was that of the middle ages; the modem world was that of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.) He then proposed that an admittedly over-simplified chart can in a
brief picture capture the essence of most of the changes that occurred between Medieval
times and the eighteenth and nineteenth century period of classic liberalism.
57. See BEAUCHAMP & BOWIE, supra note 41, at 20-21; BEHRMAN, supra note 41, at
1-10; BRAYBROOKE, supra note 36; ALLEN E. BUCHANAN, ETHICS, EFFICIENCY AND THE
MARKEr (1985); THOMAS DONALDSON & PATRICIA WERHANE, ETHICAL ISSUES IN
BUSINESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH (1983); DAVID B. RAPHAEL, ADAM SMITH (1985).
For a discussion of the relationship of business ethics to larger social issues, see NATALE,
supra note 52. See OSTRUM, supra note 42. This discussion also draws on several
discussions of classic liberalism. See Go'rFRIED DIETZE, LIBERALISM PROPER AND PROPER
LIBERALISM 96-103 (1985); ROBERT A. NISBEr, THE MAKING OF MODERN SOCIETY 95-108
(1986); ROBERT A. NISBET, SOCIAL CHANGE AND HISTORY 126-28, 142, 150-54, 186-88
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believed that human beings are, by nature, essentially competitive and self-
interested.' Further, Smith believed that nothing can change these
"scientific" facts." Conflict between human beings, therefore, is
inevitable, at least in heterogenous societies. Building on these
perceptions of scientific facts, Smith argued that social institutions should
assume that people will act in self-interested and competitive ways."
Competition and self-interest, Smith thought, are not necessarily bad things
in human beings. 1  In fact, they may well be good things. If the self-
interest of one individual or group is juxtaposed with the self-interest of
another individual or group, then the respective self-interests of these
individuals or groups check or balance each other.' If this occurs, a
society need not be ruled by an all powerful sovereign. Rather, individual
people control each other.
Two final aspects of Smith's thinking must also be mentioned.'
(1969). For analysis of these issues from wildly different perspectives, see JOHN KENNETH
GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS IN PERSPEcTIVE (1987); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY,
POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (1967); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960);
ROBERT L. HEILBRONER & LESTER C. THUROW, ECONOMICS EXPLANED (1987);
HEILBRONER, supra note 36; ALBERT 0. HIRsCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS
(1977); Irvin Kristol, The Capitalist Conception of Justice, in BUSINESS ETHIcS: READINGS
AND CASES IN CORPORATE MORALITY 44-51 (W. Michael Hoffman & Jennifer Mills Moore
eds., 1984); Joseph A. Pichler, Capitalism in America: Moral Issues and Public Policy, in
ETHICS, FREE ENTERPRISE AND PUBLIC POLICY 19-40 (Richard T. De George & Joseph A.
Pichner eds., 1978); SCHUMPETER, supra note 36.
58. To be sure, Smith believed that human beings are capable of altruistic acts, and
indeed engage in such acts frequently. However, Smith believed that people cannot be
counted on to engage in altruistic acts. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 57, at 64-65.
59. Jack Hirshleifer, writing in 1959, put the point most bluntly. "[P]eople other than
saints," he noted, "simply are more interested in their own health, comfort, and safety than
in other people's and will continue to be until the establishment of the Kingdom of God on
earth." Jack Hirshleifer, Capitalist Ethics, Tough or Soft?, J. L. ECoN. 114, 117-18 (1959).
Then he made the crucial point. "All actual social systems, though not all social
philosophies, must recognize and cope with that fact." Id. at 118.
60. HEILBRONER& THUROW, supra note 57, at 27.
61. Id. at 29.
62. Id.
63. See generally Frank Knight, The Ehics of Competition, in DAVID BRAYBROOKE,
ETHICS IN THE WORLD OF BUSINESS 28-31 (1983). Note carefully in this context two
important limiting points about Smith's ideas. First, Smith addressed his theories to the
problems of heterogenous societies where people have profoundly differing interests and
desires. In homogenous societies, or in heterogenous societies where shared interests
temporarily predominate - societies under attack in a state of war, for example - different
people's interests do not conflict. Second, Smith did not in any sense feel that the "invisible
hand" of the market place could solve all of a society's problems, or that business was
somehow the savior of humanity. In fact, Smith repeatedly denounced the greed and avarice
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 9:2 19941
First, recall that Locke believed that competition rather than cooperation is
a defining characteristic of social institutions. However, Smith believed
that social institutions should promote a particular kind of competitive
behavior rather than competitive behavior generally." Competitions over
power or intellect, or ability, Smith believed, produce unnecessary
disharmony in a society.' Thus, Smith argued that the competitive
inclinations of human beings should be, as much as possible, channeled
into competitive activities involving reciprocal self-interest.' In
connection with such activities, which are now generally called "market"
activities, people advance their own self-interests by advancing the self-
interests of others.' In other words, Smith called for institutions that
encouraged people to help themselves by helping others. Second, as
Hayek has noted, Smith and other classical liberals believed that complex
enterprises produce prodigious amounts of information that must be
processed if those enterprises are expected to function smoothly.' Thus,
Hayek continues, classical liberals like Smith thought that if societies use
"centralized" information-processing mechanisms, such mechanisms must
either be incredibly massive and powerful or simply unable to handle the
job. ' But the existence of massive and powerful centralized institutions
is flatly inconsistent with the underlying premises of classical liberalism.
Hence, Hayek insists that classical liberalism requires decentralized
information processing mechanisms.7
of business people and repeatedly called for shared community responsibilities. See




67. HEILBRONER & THuRow, supra note 57, at 27. Contrary to popular belief,
markets in the economic sense of people and businesses buying and selling goods and
services are not as *old as the hills, as ancient as the Bible." Id. at 11. Thus they are not,
as many think, an eternal element of human nature itself. In fact, just the opposite is true.
As two important economic Historians have recently noted, "[m]ost production and
distribution took place [prior to the late Middle Ages] by following the dictates of tradition or
the orders of a lord. In general, only the small leftovers found their way to the market stalls
. .. . Markets were the ornaments of society, tradition and command its iron structure.*
HEILBRONER & THUROW, supra note 57, at 12. Markets for the buying and selling of goods,
services, money and land did not exist in any significant way prior to the late sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. Id. at 15.
68. F.A. HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL
JUSTICE (1976); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (1967);
F.A. HAYEK, TilE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960).
69. HEILBRONER & THUROW, supra note 57.
70. Id.
ADVERSARY SYSTEM OF JUSTICE AND ADR
A full picture of the notion of classical liberalism, a picture that is
essentially a mirror image of the picture of civic humanism described
earlier, can now be seen. First, proponents of classical liberalism suggest
that science itself has established that human beings are, by nature, self-
interested and competitive. (Proponents of civic humanism, it should
be recalled, insist that science demonstrates that human beings are, by
nature, cooperative and altruistic.). Second, proponents of classical
liberalism argue that the self-interest and competitive instincts of individual
people are good things rather than bad, at least from an overall social
perspective.' This is so, these people believe, because the use of these
instincts in a "check and balance" fashion eliminates the need for all
powerful governments. (Civic humanists, of course, seek to root out
competition and self- interest). Third, proponents of classical liberalism
believe that social institutions should encourage people to engage in
competitive activities that involve markets, such as activities that employ
reciprocal self-interest.' (Again, civic humanists have no interest in
these things.) Finally, classical liberalism requires information processing
to be done in a decentralized manner.' (Civic humanists, it should be
recalled, do not have problems with centralized power.)Notions of classical liberalism serve as the foundation for two
major social systems in Western society - the systems of laissez-faire
economics and political pluralism. Laissez-faire economic systems are
premised on the assumption that people are, by nature, essentially
competitive and self-interested. 5 Further, such economic systems use
the self-interest and competitive instincts of individual people and groups
as checks on the self-interest and competitive instincts of other individuals
and groups. In addition, proponents of laissez-faire economic systems
attempt to channel people into competitive activities involving markets that
involve reciprocal self-interests. Finally, laissez-faire economic systems
attempt to decentralize information processing power as widely as
possible.
Similar things can be said about systems of political pluralism.
71. To be sure, proponents of classical liberalism acknowledge that people are capable
of altruistic acts. Everyday. observation proves that. However, proponents of this notion
believe that people cannot be counted on'to engage in altruistic and cooperative acts.
72. HEtLBRONER & THuRow, supra note 57.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Adnittedly, proponents of laissez-faire economic systems acknowledge that human
beings are capable of altruistic and cooperative behavior. However, these proponents believe
that human beings cannot be counted on to act in ways other than self-interested and
competitive.
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Historians and political theorists now know that James Madison and
Alexander Hamilton,' perhaps the two most important drafters of the
United States Constitution of 1787,' shared many beliefs with Locke and
Smith.' Most significantly, these two Americans shared with their
predecessors a sense of uneasiness about the ability of human beings
generally to transcend personal self-interest." Further, Madison and
76. MCDONALD, supra note 31, at 292-93. Much of the following discussion is also
drawn from several important recent books on the American constitution. See JOHN P.
DIGOINS, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS: VIRTUE, SELF INTEREST AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM (1984); VINCENT OSTRUM, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF A
COMPOUND REPUBLIC (2d ed. 1987); GARY WILLS, EXPLAININo AMERICA: THE
FEDERALIST (1981); see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE
190-200 (1980); THOMAS A. SPRAGENS, THE IRONY OF LIBERAL REASON 87-90, 297-301
(1981); Herbert J. Storing, What the Ani-Federalists Were For, in I THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 73-76 (1981); BENJAMIN R. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: HOW
LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO THE CONSTITUTION 3-17 (1942); Jeffrey D. Wallin, John Locke and
the American Founding, in NATURAL RIGHT AND POLITICAL RIGHT 143-68 (Thomas B.
Silver & Peter W. Schramm eds., 1984); Frank I. Michelman, Traces of Self Government,
100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 21, 49, 58-60 (1986); Warren J. Samuels, The Political Economy of
Adam Smith, 87 ETHICS 189 (1977); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986); Cass R. Sunnstein,
Constirutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987); Cass R. Sunnstein,
Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985).
77. It must be noted immediately that Thomas Jefferson, John and Samuel Adams, and
Patrick Henry did not attend the convention. Had they done so, history might have turned
out very differently. These men rejected the Hobbes/Smith view of the venality of human
nature and subscribed to a view more consistent with the philosophy of Rousseau, a
philosophy arguing that societal institutions corrupted human beings. MCDONALD, supra
note 31, at 158-59, 186-87.
78. Compare, for example, Smith's comments about rulers themselves with Hamilton's
and Madison's views. As McDonald has noted, Smith believed that two kinds of political
leaders emerge in times of crisis. MCDONALD, supra note 31, at 292-93. One kind holds
out some plausible plan of reformation, a plan that this kind of leader pretends will not only
remove the inconveniences and relieve the distresses immediately complained of but will also
prevent such problems from ever arising again. This kind of leader imagines that different
members of a great society can be arranged just as simply as the hand arranges different
pieces upon a chessboard. The other kind of leader, Smith argued, acts with temper and
moderation, respecting the established power and privileges of individuals. More
importantly, this other kind of leader accommodates public arrangements with the "confirmed
habits and prejudices of the people." Id.
79. "Has it not .. . invariably been found that momentary passions, and immediate
interests, have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than general or
remote considerations of policy, utility or justice?" THE FEDERALIST No. 6 (Alexander
Hamilton); see also OSTRUM, supra note 42, at 53. Madison used a vivid and now justly
famous metaphor to make the same point: "If men were angels no government would be
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on
government would be necessary.' THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). Madison
precisely defined the problem as he and Hamilton saw it: "In framing a government which is
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Hamilton believed that competition will inevitably exist in human societies,
at least in heterogenous societies. Believing as they did in the inevitability
of conflict and in the inability of people generally to rise above self-
interest, Madison and Hamilton argued that political institutions should
closely resemble the economic institutions that Smith had described."
Political institutions, Hamilton and Madison thought, should take
advantage of the competitive and self-interested nature of human beings
rather than simply decry those things. Thus, political institutions should
create mechanisms whereby individual people or groups checked each
other.2' Further, Madison and Hamilton believed that political
institutions should attempt to channel competitive instincts into market-like
activities.' Political figures and groups, these men argued, should
advance their own interests principally by advancing the interests of
others. Finally, Madison and Hamilton apparently concluded that complex
societies should disburse information processing and decision making
power as widely as possible.'
to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable
the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself."
McDONALD, supra note 31, at 205. To be sure, both Madison and Hamilton thought that
human beings were capable of altruistic and cooperative acts, as well as engaging in what
were then called "republican" virtues. However, Madison and Hamilton believed that human
beings could not be counted on to engage in such acts. For extended comments about links
between the political views of the American founders and the economic views of Adam
Smith, see Hirshlaifer, supra note 59, at 117-18.
80. Hirshlaifer, supra note 59.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. The Constitution that Hamilton and Madison helped draft in 1787 and the system of
political pluralism that has evolved from use of that Constitution, rests squarely on notions of
classical liberalism. This Constitution and the system of political pluralism disbursed
political power widely, institutionalized conflict between various centers of power, contained
extensive reciprocal self-interest characteristics, and decentralized information and decision
making. For example, the drafters split political power between the states and the federal
government and between the various branches of the federal government. The drafters also
infused that document with market characteristics. For example, democracy itself is a market
idea. To advance their own self-interests, such as getting elected, political figures in
democracies must cater to the interests of others, namely, the voters. Furthermore, market
characteristics play a major role in American governmental institutions. For example, except
in unusual situations, the legislative branch in the American system cannot do what it wants
to do unless it can get the executive and the judicial branches to agree, and vice versa. To
get such agreement, these respective branches must cater to the interests of each other. Even
the sub-branches of the legislature must cater to each other's interests. Both houses must
approve all legislation.
The American political system also disburses information processing and decision
making powers quite broadly. Local government officials process some information and
make some decisions, as do regional officials and state officials. National officials of many
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IV. THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT
Clearly, a direct link exists between the adversary system of
justice and classical liberalism. As noted earlier, the adversary system of
justice came into full fledged existence in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. It replaced a system of dispute resolution that had included
many elements of what today would be called mediation and alternative
dispute resolution. At about the same time, Locke, Smith, and others
created the notions of classical liberalism. The timing is not coincidental.
The adversary system of justice, like laissez-faire economics and political
pluralism, rests upon the belief that human beings, though capable of
altruistic and cooperative acts, are basically motivated by self-interest and
competitive instincts. Thus, the adversary system of justice does not
expect people to tell the truth on the witness stand or to reveal things that
hurt their positions. Rather, the adversary system sets up a "checking"
system. One side's lies and concealment check the other side's lies and
concealment." Further, the adversary system of justice, like laissez-faire
economic systems and pluralistic political systems, steers competition into
market-like activities. This is done, of course, by requiring lawyers and
litigants in adversary proceedings to advance their own interests principally
by catering to the interests of others, namely judges and jurors.ss In
different types, also process such information. In other words, in the American political
system, countless different political institutions exist to process prodigious amounts of
political information.
84. Sisella Bok briefly mentions the adversary system of justice and insists that lying in
that system is not justified. Unfortunately, Bok makes no reference to anything remotely
resembling the ideas discussed herein. SISELuA BOK, LYING 159-64 (1978). However,
Professor Missner makes an interesting point in this context. He states that falsehoods cease
to be falsehoods when it is understood on all sides that the truth is not expected to be spoken.
It is well known, he continues, that a lawyer's job is to win for the client and not to tell the
truth. Thus, falsehoods committed by lawyers are not falsehoods. MISSNER, supra note 52,
at 87.
85. This last point highlights a crucially important aspect of the adversary system of
justice. Although adversary legal proceedings are frequently compared to sporting contests,
this analogy is actually quite misleading. To be sure, a sporting contest and adversary
litigation both assume self-interested actors. A sporting contest and adversary litigation
encourage competition. However, sporting contests for the most part involve fixed rules for
determining winners and losers, superior and inferior performances. Whoever runs the
fastest, for example, or scores the most points, or lifts the heaviest weight, wins. The
competition incident to adversary litigation, however, is very different. It involves reciprocal
self-interest. In this kind of competition, competitors who win are competitors who best
cater to the interests of others. Thus, the only kinds of sporting contests that could
appropriately be compared to adversary litigation are kinds of contests in which judgments
are made subjectively by a panel of judges - figure skating contests, perhaps, or diving
contests. Only in these kinds of sporting events do athletes prevail principally by catering to
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addition, the adversary system of justice seems to rest in part on the
observation that the vast amounts of information that come together in any
kind of complicated dispute simply cannot be processed by a single
individual. Thus, the adversary system of justice, like all systems that rest
on the notions of classical liberalism, distributes information-processing
responsibility as widely as possible.
One final link must be noted between classical liberalism and the
adversary system of justice. The adversary system, like the systems of
laissez-faire economics and political pluralism, seeks to disburse power as
widely as possible." As Blackstone wrote during the eighteenth century,
"[1]t is not to be expected from human nature, that the few should always
be attentive to the interests and good of the many."' "[W]hen entrusted
to any single magistrate," Blackstone continued, "partiality and injustice
have an ample field to range in."' These words, of course, could just as
easily have been written by Adam Smith or James Madison.
Because direct links exist between the adversary system of justice
and classical liberalism, direct links should also exist between
"alternatives" to the adversary system of justice and civic humanism. As
noted earlier, "pre-adversarial" dispute resolution procedures in Europe
contained large amounts of what -would now be called mediation.
Mediation is a core idea in civic humanism. Even stronger evidence of
this link can be found in modem developments.
Many commentators have suggested in recent years that the
adversary system is in "decline" or in some kind of "twilight" stage."'
the interests of others.
86. For an interesting discussion of the theory behind limiting the power of judges, see
SHELDON GOLDMAN & THOMAS P. JAHINGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL
SYSTEM 192-99 (1985).
87. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 325-26 (1799).
88. Id.
89. For two important discussions of this topic, see Kenneth M. Holland, The Twilight
of Adversariness: Trends In Ci vi Justice, in THE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 17-30
(Philip Du Bois ed. 1982) and Resnik, supra note 14, at 494. For other comments about the
twilight or breakdown of the adversary system, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING
AMERICAN LAW 32-34 (1984); Bruce Ackerman, Four Questions for Legal Theory, in
NOMOS XXII, PROPERTY 351-75 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980);
Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooptation of a Profession, in LAW AND CONTROL IN SoCIETY 222 (Ronald L. Akers &
Richard A. Hawkins eds., 1975); MORTON DEUTSCH, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A SOCIAL -
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1985); HAZARD AND VErER, supra note 26, at 152;
IUEERMAN, supra note 24, at 168-71; MURRAY L. SCHWARTZ, LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (2d ed. 1985); Richard B. Stewart, The Limits of Administrative Law, in THE
COURTS: SEPARATION OF POWERS 75-92 (Bette Goulet ed., 1983); THE GOOD LAWYER,
supra note 8; WILIUAMS, supra note 52; Abel, supra note 24, at 287; Jackson B. Battle, In
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Virtually all of these commentators suggest that the reasons for this decline
are exclusive to the profession of law itself. In fact, something else
almost certainly provides at least part of the explanation for the modern-
day decline of the adversary system.
The systems of laissez-faire economics and political pluralism
came under relentless attack in America during the early and middle years
of the twentieth century. During the New Deal period, for example, and
afterward, the government constantly interfered with market forces in
connection with economic issues. The very visible hand of the
government at this time gradually came to replace the invisible hand of the
market." In short, in the field of economics, acceptance of the tenets of
Search of the Adversary System: The Cooperative Practices of Private Criminal Defense
Attorneys, 50 Tox. L. REV. 60 (1971); Abram Chayes, Public Law Litigation and the Burger
Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982); Richard Danzig & Michael J. Lowy, Everyday Disputes
and Mediation in the United States: A Reply to Professor Felsteiner, 9 L. & Soc'y REV. 675
(1975); William L. F. Felsteiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9
L. & Soc'y REV. 63 (1974); Fiss, supra 26, at 1077; Fiss, supra note 25, at 121; Owen M.
Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 43 (1979); Fuller & Randall, supra note
1, at 1160-61; Galanter, supra note 24, at 257; Landsman, Decline of the Adversary Sstem,
supra note 14, at 251; Mitchell, supra note 1, at 293; Penegar, supra note 1, at 307; A.
Kenneth Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of Truth, 1978 DUKE L. J. 921 (1978);
David L. Shapiro, Some Problems of Discovery in an Adversary System, 63 MINN. L. REV.
1055 (1979); Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT
RES. 52 (1967).
90. George C. Lodge, The Large Corporation and the New American Ideology, in
CORPORATIONS AND THE COMMON GOOD 61-77 (Robert Dickie & Leroy S. Rouner eds.,
1980). According to Lodge, virtually all political and economic actions that took place
during the New Deal era either categorically refuted or significantly limited every single one
of the five key Lockean principles of the competitive model. The five Lockean principles
were individualism, property rights, competition, limited state, and specialization. The
modem welfare state, of course, rejects individualism as the sole guiding light, substituting
for such individualism the idea that community rights must frequently take precedence over
individual rights. Furthermore, though the modern welfare state has by no means eliminated
individual property rights, it has significantly limited them and though it has by no means
eliminated competition as a driving force in society it has strongly urged cooperative
behavior. Finally, the modern welfare state has replaced the idea of a weak state, and the
concomitant idea of specialization and fragmentation, with the idea of a strong central state.
A number of writers about business ethics other than Lodge have made similar
observations. For example, Charles Powers and David Vogel noted several years ago in
their book, Ethics in the Education of Business Managers, that the eighteenth and nineteenth
century ideas of individualism and competition gradually gave way during the twentieth
century to ideas about community and cooperation for several reasons. See CHARLES
PowERs & DAVID VOGEL, ETHICS IN THE EDUCATION OF BUSINESS MANAGERS (1986).
Powers and Vogel note, for example, that by the early twentieth century, business institutions
had grown enormously. Concomitantly, people increasingly had the sense during these early
days of the century that those huge businesses were not operating in such a way as to
generate overall public good. Id. The Crash of 1929, of course, brought concrete reality to
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classical liberalism was gradually supplanted, during and after the New
Deal era, by acceptance of the tenets of civic humanism. The same thing
occurred in the field of politics. Political power became increasingly
concentrated. Further, administrative agencies, which combine the powers
of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government came
into prominence during this time.'- Classical liberalism was losing out to
civic humanism.
Not surprisingly, similar developments occurred simultaneously in
connection with dispute resolution procedures in the field of law.' 2 The
adversary system of justice came under relentless attack during the New
Deal period. For example, reformers in the American legal system
assisted in the writing and adoption the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.'" Although many of these new federal rules simply codified
existing dispute resolution practice or modified existing rules in minor
ways, some of these rules broke new ground.
The most innovative of the new procedural rules involved
discovery." The pre-discovery system was perfectly consistent with the
underlying tenets of classical liberalism. Lawyers who worked in a pre-
discovery system simply assumed that individuals would not act against
their own self-interests. Thus, these lawyers expected surprises, tricks,
and concealments. However, pre-discovery lawyers also believed that the
check and balance process of adversarial proceedings themselves would
ultimately sort things out for the best. Furthermore, prior to the
enactment of the rules of discovery, judges themselves played very minor
roles in litigation prior to commencement of trials.
this previously abstract thought. Mindful of the problems just noted, Powers and Vogel note
that the New Deal era brought forth tremendous legal restraints on business activities. Thus,
the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith gave way to the very visible hand of Roosevelt.
Furthermore, John Maynard Keynes' ideas about a "mixed" economy, that is, an economy in
which competitive and market forces did not function entirely on their own, gained almost
complete acceptance.
91. An excellent discussion of the history of administrative law in the United States is
provided by Stewart, supra note 89, at 75-92. For a discussion of how adversarial
proceedings are widely used in administrative agencies, see Adam Yamolinsky, Responsible
Law Making in a Technologically Specialized Society, in AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, LAW IN A
CHANGING SociErY 105-07 (Geoffrey C. Hazard ed., 1968).
92. Yamolinsky, supra note 91.
93. In a recent paper, Judith Resnik described the process used, and the philosophic
ideas controlling, the drafting of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Resnik, supra note
14. Resnik argues, quoting original sources and much commentary, that the drafters of these
rules simply tried to bolster the efficiency of the adversary system itself. It was not until
much later, she suggests, that the adversary system itself began to fall apart. Indeed, she
suggests that the 1960s and 1970s saw the first real breakdown in that system. Id.
94. rd.
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The rules of discovery tried to change all of this.' Discovery
rules are an attempt to make lawyers and clients act against their own self-
interests. Further, although there are sanctions for violation of discovery
rules, the rules of discovery themselves place the principal onus for
compliance on individual lawyers themselves. Finally, rules of discovery
concentrate power in the hands of judges. Pre-trial rulings that judges
make on discovery issues are often the single most important rulings of an
entire piece of litigation.9 ' In addition, judges regularly use the rules of
discovery to seize control over the litigation itself, stripping that control
from the respective lawyers.
The enactment of rules of discovery is not the only legal evidence
of the increasing rejection of classical liberalism and the increasing
acceptance of civic humanism. The New Deal and post-New Deal periods
also saw increasingly widespread use of adjudication procedures in
connection with juvenile crimes and in connection with civil commitment
proceedings. Both have adopted adjudication procedures that are more
"cooperative" than "competitive."'7 In addition, the middle and later
95. For a discussion of the tension between the rules of discovery and the adversary
system ofjustice, see Shapiro, supra note 89, at 1090.
Is it realistic to expect litigants to treat the discovery phase of a case as
a collaborative, disinterested search for the truth of the matter while the
trial remains an arena for self-interested, competitive behavior? If
discovery standards clearly oblige adversaries to disclose damaging
information, what consideration would induce self-interested
competitive adversaries to comply with these obligations?
HAZARD & VErraE, supra note 26, at 152. For a discussion of the "adversarial" nature of
present day discovery, see Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Chbracter of Civil Discovery, 31
VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978).
96. Shapiro, supra note 89, at 1090.
97. Holland, supra note 89. Social scientists have for many years been studying the
likelihood, or unlikelihood, that human beings will engage in altruistic, or, to use a more
technical term, "pro-social" behavior. See generally NANCY EISENBERO, ALTRUISTIC
EMOTION, COGNITION AND BEHAVIOR (1986); DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF PRO-
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (Erwin Staub et al. eds., 1984); Nancy Eisenberg et al., The Role of
Sympathy and Altruistic Personality Traits in Helping: A Re-Examination, 57 J.
PERSONALITY 41-67 (1989); see also C.R. BADcOCK, THE PROBLEM OF ALTRUISM:
FREUDIAN AND DARWINIAN SOLUTIONS (1986); KENNETH E. BOULDINO, THE ECONOMY OF
LOVE AND FEAR 89-101 (1973); DAVID COLLARD, ALTRUISM AND ECONOMY (1978);
HOWARD MAROoiS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM AND RATIONALITY: A THEORY OF SOCIAL
CHOICE (1982); EDMUND S. PHELPS, ALTRUISM, MORALITY AND ECONOMIC THEORY
(1975). At least some of the work done by these social scientists, most notably the work
done by Morton Deutsch, has come to the attention of people who have written about the
adversary system of justice. DEUTSCH, supra note 89. Reflecting on the bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Deutsch observed in the late 1940s that nations could either
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years of the twentieth century saw more and more every-day civil and
criminal cases terminated well before true adversarial litigation. Thus, at
the present time, most civil proceedings are settled well before an actual
trial begins.' The same thing is now true of most criminal matters."
It is clear, therefore, that in these contexts adversarial justice is the
exception rather than the norm. The core idea in the adversary system,
namely competition, is lost. In addition, the twentieth century has
witnessed a tremendous increase in the use of "alternative" dispute
cooperatively work together to solve their joint problems or competitively work against each
other for relative advantage. Deutsch then set out to see whether cooperation or competition
worked better in terms of dispute resolution. Deutsch's research ultimately demonstrated two
things. First, relatively few conflicts actually are intrinsically and inevitably win-lose
conflicts. Id. at 72. Rather, common ground almost always exists between contesting
parties. Compromise solutions, therefore, can almost always be found. Second, Deutsch's
research showed that cooperative groups on the whole function better than competitive groups
when it comes to dispute resolution. Id. at 67.
98. Holland, supra note 89.
99. On this point, which will be returned to later in this paper, see generally Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1037 (1984). Schulhofer
takes on much of the current legal ethics establishment by arguing that plea bargaining in
criminal cases was neither inevitable nor necessarily a good thing. Plea bargaining,
Schulhofer acknowledges, seems to be consistent with the work of many organizational
analysts, work which suggests that people usually wish to reduce uncertainty or conflict.
However, Schulhofer continues, reduction of uncertainty and conflict in criminal proceedings,
such as the institutionalization of plea bargaining, can produce great unfairness. Empirical
studies show, Schulhofer argues, that reductions in uncertainly and conflict in criminal
proceedings essentially force most criminal defendants to plead guilty, at least to lesser
offenses. But, he argues, empirical studies also show that at least some defendants forced to
plead guilty in these circumstances in fact had meritorious defenses to the charges brought
against them, defenses that might well have gained them acquittal had they actually gone to
trial.
The problem in criminal proceedings is not, Schulhofer concludes, a problem with
the underlying model of the adversary system of justice. That model, Schulhofer suggests, is
an extremely good one. Cooperation is not better in criminal proceedings than competition.
Rather, the problem in criminal proceedings simply is one of time and numbers. Can huge
numbers of criminal defendants be given adversary proceedings without creating massive
delays? Schulhofer, relying on data generated in an experiment in the Philadelphia criminal
courts, unequivocally says yes.
Schulhofer's data, of course, when contrasted with Deutsch's, brings this
discussion back to its primary question. Can science itself, either biological science or social
science, provide any help in deciding whether human dispute resolution procedures should
rest upon the competitive model or the cooperative model, or upon some combination of the
two? The answer to that question should now be clear. Science itself cannot at the present
time add anything of value to discussions about the value, or lack thereof, of the adversary
system of justice itself. Or, better said, science cannot add anything of value to discussions in
this context, except in the crucial area of gender.
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resolution procedures such as arbitration and mediation."e
These things are not the only evidence of twentieth century
disenchantment with the adversarial proceedings and, consequently,
twentieth century disenchantment with the overall notion of classical
liberalism. The post-New Deal era brought an increasing tendency of
judges to question witnesses themselves, or even to call special
witnesses."' Further, this era brought an increasing tendency by some
judges to balance the respective skills of the opposing lawyers."l Both
of these things, of course, fly directly in the face of traditional conceptions
of the adversarial process. However, both of them align perfectly with the
tenets of civic humanism.
One additional example of the increasing dissatisfaction of
twentieth century American lawyers with the notions of classical liberalism
and the concomitant increasing satisfaction with the notions of civic
humanism must be mentioned. For almost twenty years, Chayes has been
arguing that an entirely new form of litigation has been developing in the
courts of the United States. Chayes calls this new form of litigation
"Public Law Litigation."1" Public law litigation, Chayes insists, differs
dramatically from traditional adversarial proceedings. Frequently, for
example, courts involved with this kind of litigation join additional
litigants, often against the will of the initial litigating parties. This
procedure flies squarely in the face of a crucial aspect of traditional
adversarial proceedings. In adversarial proceedings, the parties themselves
decide who will be joined in the suit, and who will not be joined. In
addition, "class actions" frequently occur. In these actions, litigants seek
to determine the rights of whole communities of people. Traditional
actions for the most part simply adjudicate the rights of individuals.
Further, and again contrary to what occurs in traditional adversarial
100. The most significant example of the American legal systems' "failing faith" in
adversarial justice, Resnik argues, is the movement toward Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR). For recent discussions of ADR, most of which make similar points, see The
Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATuRE 257 (1986). See also
LFo L. KANOWITZ, ALTERNATIVE DisPuT RESOLUTION (1986); Danzig & Lowy, supra
note 89, at 675; Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALs L. J. 1669 (1985); Skolnick, supra
note 89.
101. Holland, supra note 89.
102. Resnik says this is another example of the legal professions "failing faith" in
adversarial proceedings. Resnik, supra note 14.
103. See Chayes, supra note 26. Professor Chayes hints at a connection between
changes in the adversary system and changes in society as a whole. Id. at 1285-86. See also
Chayes, supra note 89. For a discussion of similar notions, see Arthur S. Miller & Jerome
A. Barron, The Supreme Court, The Adversary System and the Flow of Information to the
Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187 (1975).
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proceedings, judges in public law litigation frequently play a very active
role.
It should now be clear that the dispute resolution procedures used
in connection with the public law litigation that Chayes describes are much
more consistent with the tenets of civic humanism than with the tenets of
classical liberalism. Whereas proponents of classical liberalism believe
that human beings are, by nature, self-interested and competitive,
proponents of civic humanism believe that human beings are, by nature,
cooperative and altruistic. Successful resolution of public law litigation, it
seems, requires cooperation and altruism. Further, proponents of classical
liberalism insist that self-interested behavior by individuals is actually a
good thing rather than a bad thing. Self-interested actions, these people
believe, at least when checked by self-interested actions of others, actually
increase the overall store of human good. Civic humanists and Chayes
disagree.1 ' In addition, proponents of classical liberalism believe that
social institutions, including dispute resolution institutions, should
encourage people to engage in competitive activities that involve markets.
Again civic humanists and Chayes, seem to disagree. Finally, advocates
of classical liberalism insist that power, and information processing,
should be disbursed as widely as possible. Obviously, this is not
something with which proponents of public law litigation, nor proponents
generally of civic humanism, agree.
V. THE "NATURE" OF DIsPUTE RESOLUTION
It should now be clear that two distinct conceptions of judicial
dispute resolution exist. One *of these, the traditional "adversary" system,
rests on the notion that human beings are, by nature, self-interested and
competitive. The other, the modern alternative dispute resolution system,
rests on the notion that human beings are, by nature, cooperative and
altruistic. Ironically, these facts reveal that the fundamental dispute at
issue here is not an issue regarding competing philosophies. Rather, the
real dispute here is about scientific evidence, which exists in the fields of
biology and sociology. What exactly is the nature of human beings?
A. Biology and Dispute Resolution
Very near the beginning of his important recent book, The Nature
of Politics, Roger Masters notes that in recent years scientists working in
104. Chayes, supra note 26.
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the fields of biology, neurophysiology, neurochemistry, experimental
psychology, ethology, and ecology have gathered a substantial amount of
empirical information about human nature." s  Masters then notes that
these scientific developments create one of the central intellectual
paradoxes of the second half of the twentieth century.
At a time when the traditional concerns of philosophers are
more amenable to scientific analysis than at any period since
the inception of Western political thought, scientific inquiry and
political philosophy have generally been divorced. Humans
have, for the first time, the capacity to engage in genetic
engineering - and thus the power to create new forms of
human existence - yet the social sciences remain largely
untouched by research in the biological sciences.1"
105. MASTERS, supra note 30, at xii. The literature of sociobiology and biopolitics is
immense. However, much of that literature is discussed in Masters' book. Masters generally
looks favorably on attempts to use biological science to examine human social institutions.
Another book that also examines much of the literature is Phillip Kitcher, Vaulting Ambition:
Sociobiology and the Quest for Human Nature. PHILLIP KiTCHER, VAULTING AMBITION:
SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE QUEST FOR HUMAN NATURE (1985) [hereinafter VAULTING
AMBITION]. Kitcher is extraordinarily critical of most attempts to use scientific knowledge in
connection with discussions of human social institutions. An updated version of some of
Kitcher's earlier points is Phillip Kitcher, Imitating Selection, in Evolutionary Processes and
Metaphors. Phillip Kitcher, Imitating Selection, in EVOLUTIONARY PROCESSES AND
METAPHORS 295-318 (Mae-Wan Ho & Sidney W. Fox eds., 1988). A number of recent
works not cited in the huge bibliographies of Masters and Kitcher provided the present writer
with important insights. See BADcocK, supra note 97; CHARLES CRAWFORD Er AL.,
SOCIOBIOLO AND PSYCHOLOGY: IDEAS, ISSUES AND APPLICATIONS (1987); ROBERT H.
FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS (1988); JOHN
& MARY GRIBBIN, THE ONE PERCENT ADVANTAGE (1988); CHRISTOPHER ROBERT
HALLPIKE, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION (1986); ROBERT A. HINDE,
INDIVIDUALS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND CULTURE: LINKS BETWEEN ETHOLOGY AND THE
SOCtAL SCIENCES (1987); AUSTIN L. HUGHES, EVOLUTION AND HUMAN INSHiP (1988);
HOWARD L. KAYE, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MODERN BIOLOGY: FROM SOCIAL
DARWINISM TO SOCIOBIOLOY (1986); SAMUEL P. OLINER & PEARL M. OLINER, THE
ALTRUISTIC PERSONALITY: RESCUERS OF JEWS IN NAZI EUROPE (1988); THE ROLE OF
BEHAVIOR IN EVOLUTION (Henry C. Plotkin ed., 1988); Brian A. Gladu, Evolutionary
Controversy and Biopolitics: Separating Issues from Rhetoric: A Commentary on Gans'
Essay, "Punctuated Equilibria and Political Science,' 7 POL. LIFE SCi. 72 (1988); Glenn W.
Harrison & Jack Hirshleifer, An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link / Best Shot Models
of Public Goods, 97 J. POL. ECON. 201 (1989); David Marquand, Preceptoral Politics,
Yeoman Democracy and the Enabling State, 23 GOV'T & OPPOSITION 261 (1988); Alexander
Rosenberg, Grievous Faults in Vaulting Ambition, 98 ETHICS 827 (1988).
106. MASTERS, supra note 30, at xii.
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Austin Hughes expands on that point.11"
[S]ociobiology (at its best, at any rate) makes no value
judgments regarding good or evil. If sociobiological theory
predicts that human behaviors, like those of other animals, are
likely to be largely reproductively "selfish," it makes no value
judgment as to whether this is a "good" or a "bad" thing.
Science is concerned with observation, explanation and
prediction of the material world and not with passing judgment
on it. The authors of Medieval bestiaries passed judgment on
the alleged moral qualities of the animal species they described.
We find such an idea ridiculous today, and an ecologist seeking
to understand predation does not need to reassure his readers
that he is not concerned with condemning or praising the
behavior of predators. One day, it is hoped, we will have a
filly mature science of human society, and it practitioners will
likewise feel no need of explaining that they are unconcerned
with praise or blame. When that day comes, the "ethical"
criticisms of sociobiology will seem as quaint and ludicrous as
the Medieval bestiariesil
Regrettably, the field of legal ethics has been almost wholly
untouched by recent research in the biological sciences. Most writers
about professional ethics, for example, seem to ignore completely the
work of Masters and Hughes. This is so even though the writings of these
individuals present scientific data that has already been filtered for use by
non-scientists. Further, most writers about professional ethics seem to
ignore the extraordinarily important empirical work of Edward Wilson, the
founder of the so-called field of "sociobiology." Wilson's work involves,
among other things, attempts to determine whether human beings are, by
nature, competitive or cooperative, altruistic or self-interested.1"
Finally, and perhaps most surprisingly, most writers about
professional ethics completely ignore the work of historians of science
107. HUGHES, supra note 105, at 134, 135.
108. Id. Ironically, Professor Masters, who clearly is the best defender of the field of
sociobiology, would probably disagree with these sentiments. Masters argues that the so-
called "naturalistic fallacy" - this fallacy, which Hughes is talking about, supposedly occurs
whenever scientific facts are related to decisions about values - may not be a fallacy at all.
Perhaps some values, at least those that underlie certain human social institutions, can in fact
be linked directly to scientific facts. MASTERS, supra note 30, at 182-83, 227.
109. EDWARD 0. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY (1975); EDWARD 0. WILSON, ON HUMAN
NATURE (1979).
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such as Phillip Kitcher." °  Because Kitcher is the most important
debunker of sociobiology itself, he is an important ally of people who wish
to keep ethical issues separated from scientific exploration."
Four things probably explain the failure of most writers of
professional ethics to discuss biological issues. First, as this Author has
recently demonstrated in another context, most members of the different
professions are extraordinarily parochial." Thus, most members of
professions simply have no interest in ideas from outside of their particular
fields. Second, many people who generally work in fields related to the
humanities are justifiably nervous about intellectual forays into the hard
sciences. The work of hard scientists, these people think, is simply
beyond comprehension to non-specialists. Third, as Beitz has noted, the
field of sociobiology is filled with "irritating and frequently pretentious
literature. " " Thus, people who write about ethical issues who might
initially be quite open to ideas from the hard sciences quickly lose interest
in those ideas when they read the actual literature of sociobiology.
The fourth possible explanation, perhaps the most important one,
includes an overwhelming amount of anecdotal evidence. This evidence
suggests that very large percentages of the teachers in higher education
institutions generally, and even larger percentages of such teachers who
work in fields related to the humanities, personally adhere to distinctly
left-wing political perspectives." 4  The early work of a number of
sociobiologists, however, became linked with right-wing political
110. KITCHER, VAULTING AMBITION supra note 105.
111. This is not to say, of course, that all writers in the fields of law, business,
journalism and politics completely ignore recent discussions of scientific evidence. A number
of writers about legal topics, for example, have discussed some of the literature of biology.
See, e.g., JOHN H. BECKsTROM, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE LAW: THE BIOLOGY OF ALTRUISM
IN THE COURTROOM OF THE FUTURE (1985); LAW, BIOLOGY AND CULTURE: THE
EVOLUTION OF LAW (Margaret Gruter & Paul Bohannan eds., 1983); JAMES Q. WILSON &
RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE (1985).
112. Paul T. Wangerin, The Problem of Parochialism in Legal Education, EDUC. RES.
Q. (1993).
113. Charles R. Beitz, Book Review, 93 ETHICS 219, 219 (1982) (reviewing RALPH
PErrMAN, BIoPoLTcS AND INTERNATIONAL VALUES: INVESTIGATING LIBERAL NORMS
(1981)).
114. For discussions of this topic, see generally Betrand de Jouvenel, The Treatment of
Capitalism by Continental Intellectuals, reprinted in FREDRICH A. VON HAYEK, CAPITALISM
AND THE HISTORIANS (1954). See also ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN
MIND (1989); SCHUMPETER, supra note 36, at 145.
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perspectives, most notably with a defense of laissez-faire economicsYlu
It is possible, therefore, that at least some writers about professional ethics
simply do not wish to write about empirical evidence that perhaps
undermines their positions.1 "
There can be no doubt that any discussion of possible links
between biological science and professional ethics must begin with
reference to the ideas of Charles Darwin.1 7 Darwin discovered that all
organisms, including human organisms, (1) compete against each other for
scarce resources, (2) seek primarily to pass on their genetic characteristics
to their offspring, and (3) survive only if fit.' At first glance, these
discoveries seem to give tremendous scientific support to proponents of
classical liberalism. This is so, of course, because classical liberalism
rests on the belief that human beings are essentially competitive and self
interested. Not surprisingly, therefore, some early writers about ethical
issues, most notably Herbert Spencer, quickly concluded that something
called "Social Darwinism" explained human social institutions 1
Further, as already noted, some early writers about sociobiology itself,
most notably Edward 0. Wilson, too quickly linked biological findings
with specific forms of human social institutions."
Similar direct links between biological findings and specific kinds
of social systems continue even now. Thus, as one critic of modem
sociobiology has noted, the proclaimed reach of this new scientific field is
very broad:
115. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 109; Edward 0. Wilson, Hwnan Decency is
Aninul, N. Y. TIMEs MAO., Oct. 12, 1975, at 38-50; see also Richard A. Epstein, A Taste
of Privacy: Evolution and the Emergence of a Naturalistic Ethic, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 665,
672-75 (1980); Jack Hirahleifer, Privacy: Its Origin, Function, and Future, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 649, 649 (1980).
116. Hobson has perhaps put this point best. Early sociobiological ideas, he suggests,
became the "bete noir of... many liberal intellectuals." J. Allan Hobson, M.D., Psychiatry
as Scientific Humanism: A Program Inspired by Roberto Unger's Passion, 81 Nw. U. L.
REV. 791 (1987).
117. For an excellent and comprehensive recent discussion of Darwin's work can be
found in ROBERT JOHN RICHARDS, DARWIN AND THE EMERGENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY
THEORIES OF MIND AND EEHAVIOR (1987).
118. ' For a discussion of Darwin's ideas, see generally ASHLEY MONTAGUE, DARWIN,
COMPEITION AND COOPERATION (1987) and ROBERT M. YOUNG, DARWIN'S METAPHOR
NATURE'S PLACE IN VICTORIAN CULTURE (1985).
119. A discussion of Spencer's ideas and their impact in the field of law is Herbert
Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV. 645 (1985). See also
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1954); ROBERT JOHN
RICHARDS, DARWIN AND THE EMERGENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF MIND AND
BEHAVIOR (1987); SCHWARTZ, supra note 34.
120. EDWARD 0. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY (1975).
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The promiscuity of men and the fidelity of women, the extreme
devotion of women to child care, the extraordinary selectivity
of women relative to men in choice of mate - all of these
characteristics of human social behavior and more can be traced
to the action of selfish genes. And so, in the hands of
sociobiology, the conception of people as in slavish pursuit of
self-interest extends beyond the bounds of the market to
virtually all aspects of social life. Furthermore, human
selfishness is clearly a reflection of natural law, since it is of a
piece with the selfishness of ants, birds, fish, and all other
living organisms.'"
Few modem scientists who study the biological basis of social
institutions now subscribe to the grand claims just described. Rather, most
scientists involved in this field now make only the most cautious
connections. They do this in turn for two reasons. First, as Kitcher has
demonstrated, much of the science done by sociobiologists is simply not
good science.' Observations themselves, Kitcher suggests, were often
faulty in early sociobiological research. ' Further, improper
interpretation of collected data often occurred in that early work.'
Second, as Masters notes, the data that science itself produces in this field
is very, very difficult to apply to human social institutions.IZ
"Humans - like other animals - are highly variable," he notes "and likely
to show contradictory traits."'
The first requisite for a rigorously scientific approach to human
nature is. . . willingness to abandon the beief that answers are
either/or: [olur behavior can be both innate and acquired; both
selfish and cooperative; both similar to that of other species and
uniquely human.'
Notwithstanding all of the caveats and limitations just noted, some
things probably can now safely be said about links between biological
121. SCHWARrz, supra note 34, at 315. Schwartz, incidentally, does not agree with
the propositions just cited.
122. KITCHER, VAULTING AMBITION, supra note 105.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. MAsTERs, supra note 30.
126. Id. at 1.
127. Id.
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discoveries and human behavior and social institutions. A few of those
things impact this discussion of four problems in professional ethics.
Perhaps the most important intellectual breakthrough in the entire
field of sociobiology occurred in 1964. Prior to that time, scientists who
studied the biological basis of human behavior were immensely troubled
by an apparent contradiction between Darwin's findings - survival of the
most fit - and the clear existence in human beings of both the ability and
willingness to engage in altruistic behavior. Altruistic behavior, these
scientists thought at that time, seems simply to be impossible in light of
Darwin's findings. In 1964, however, William Hamilton introduced the
idea of "inclusive fitness."' 2 Queen bees, he observed, do not mate
generally with worker bees.' Thus, worker bees do not directly pass
on genetic material.' Nevertheless, worker bees engage in enormous
amounts of work to support the queen." Such conduct, Hamilton
initially reasoned, seems flatly to contradict Darwin's theories. M  Or
maybe not. Maybe, Hamilton later concluded, organisms are fit, and thus
likely to survive, not only if they pass on their own direct genetic material,
but perhaps also if their actions increase the likelihood that the genetic
material of their kin passes on to future generations. Presto: The
existence of human altruism in a world of Darwinian fitness is
explained."' Much altruistic behavior engaged in by human beings, is
directed at close relatives. Thus, though altruistic behavior may limit the
transmission of a human being's own personal genetic material, such
behavior may well increase the likelihood of the transmission of the
genetic material of a closely related organism, namely, the person helped.
Once scientists had reconciled the existence of human altruism
with notions of Darwinian fitness, those scientists could move on to an
analysis of links between biological facts and human social institutions.
Masters has led the way in that analysis. Biology, Masters cautiously
argues, can be used to demonstrate three things about workable human
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social institutions, but only three things.' One of these three, in turn,
is critically important in connection with the present analysis. Workable
human social institutions, Masters argues, must rest on a recognition of
the fact that human beings are simultaneously competitive and cooperative,
and simultaneously altruistic and self interested.' Thus, Masters
suggests, social institutions that rest on the assumption that human beings
are solely cooperative and altruistic will not work." Likewise social
institutions that rest on the assumption that human beings are solely
competitive and self-interested also will not work.s
Regrettably, it should now be clear that the work of the
sociobiologists generally, and Masters' interpretations of that work
specifically, provide little help in connection with an attempt to choose
between the two sets of answers to the four ethical questions posed herein.
Admittedly, if the statements about the nature of human beings that
Masters and the modern biologists make are correct, then the empirical
claims about human nature upon which classical liberalism rests - claims
advanced by Hobbes, Smith and the like - simply are wrong. Likewise,
if Masters and the modem biologists are correct, then the empirical claims
about human nature upon which civic humanism rests - claims advanced
by Aristotle, Plato, Hegel, Rousseau, Marx, and the like - also are simply
wrong. So, the answers to the four ethical questions that proponents of
these two philosophic notions present may well also be wrong. However,
Masters and the modem biologists do not themselves offer any real
substitute answers.
135. Although Masters believes that certain generalizations can in fact legitimately be
made about the consistence of societal institutions with human biology, he regularly counsels
against deprecating social systems that may seem strange or even displeasing. MASTERS,
supra note 30, at 228-29.
136. Id. at 229-33.
137. Id. at 240.
138. Masters' other two general conclusions are these: Social systems based on the
rule of law are more consistent with the nature of human beings than are systems of
totalitarian and autocratic rule. Id. at 225-26, 245. Further, democratic political processes
associated with republican or constitutional forms of government seem to be naturally right
for human beings. Id. at 232, 245.
Note carefully in this context a crucial limiting point. Masters is by no means
arguing, as Francis Fukayama seems to be arguing in his much discussed recent essay, "The
End of History," that human societies themselves have gone, or are going through, some
kind of evolutionary process that ultimately will allow only one kind or another of societal
institutions to survive. See Francis Fukayama, The End of History, in THE PUBUC INTEREST
(1989). Rather, Master says that certain kinds of social institutions may well be more
consistent with human nature than other kinds of social institutions. Phillip Kiteher,
sociobiology's most important critic, also categorically rejects such evolution. Kitcher, supra
note 105, at 295-318.
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B. Social Science and Dispute Resolution
Fortunately, biologists are not the only scientists who have in
recent years conducted empirical research regarding the underlying nature
of human beings. Social scientists also have attempted to determine
whether human beings are, by nature, cooperative and altruistic or,
competitive and self-interested."
Morton Deutsch's work is of particular interest in connection with
the present analysis.' 4  During the late 1940s Deutsch observed that
nations or individuals could either work together cooperatively to solve
their joint problems or work competitively against each other for relative
advantage.""' Deutsch then attempted to determine which of those two
different kinds of dispute resolution procedures worked better, cooperative
procedures or competitive ones.' These studies ultimately established,
Deutsch concluded, that relatively few human conflicts actually are win-
lose conflicts.' Rather, contesting parties almost always can find
common ground and compromise solutions 1" Another of Deutsch's
conclusions, however, is more pertinent to the present analysis. Deutsch
claims that individuals and groups that used cooperative dispute resolution
procedures generally functioned better than individuals and groups that
used competitive dispute resolution procedures.' 4  Cooperative dispute
resolving groups, Deutsch observed, developed more inter-member
communication, more friendliness and helpfulness, and less obstructiveness
in discussions.1' In addition, Deutsch observed that people exposed to
cooperative dispute resolution procedures developed more of a feeling of
agreement with the ideas of others and a greater sense of basic similarity
in beliefs and values than people exposed to non-cooperative dispute
139. See generally DEvELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF PRO-SocIAL BEHAVIOR,
supra note 97; NANCY EISENBERO, ALTRUISTIC EMOTION, COGNITION AND BEHAVIOR
(1986); Nancy Eisenberg, The Role of Sympathy and Altruistic Personality Traits in Helping:
A Re-Examinadon, 57 J. PERSONALITY 41, 41-67 (1989); PHELPS, supra note 97; see also
BADcoc, supra note 97; BOULDING, supra note 97; COLLARD, supra note 97; MARGOLIS,
supra note 97.
140. See generally MORTON DEUTSCH, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A SOCIAL -
PSYCHOLOOICAL PERSPECTIvE (1985).
141. Id. at 64.
142. Id. at 69.
143. Id. at 94.
144. Id. at 94-95.
145. DEUTSCH, supra note 140, at 94.
146. Id.
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resolution procedures.1 47  Further, Deutsch observed that people in
cooperative groups were more likely to think of conflicting interests as
mutual problems to be solved than were people in other kinds of dispute
resolution groups.4
Deutsch's research initially seems to provide a good deal of
empirical support for the position staked out by proponents of civic
humanism. One of the fundamental tenets of that notion, of course, is an
emphasis on cooperation among humans. Sadly, however, two things
belie that preliminary conclusion. First, although Deutsch's research
indeed does suggest that social institutions that encourage cooperative and
altruistic behavior work beter in connection with the resolution of disputes
than social institutions that encourage competitive and self-interested
behavior, Deutsch's research says nothing whatsoever about the nature of
human beings themselves. Human beings, therefore, could be completely
self-interested and competitive and yet decide, for reasons of efficiency, to
use cooperative dispute resolution procedures. Thus, though Deutsch's
research may be useful in connection with questions of efficiency, it is of
no use at all in connection with questions of ethics.
Second, careful analysis reveals that the social institutions that
Deutsch proposes in light of his research findings could just as easily be
built upon the tenets of classical liberalism as upon the tenets of civic
humanism. Deutsch argues, for example, that social institutions should
encourage people to focus on the interests of people with opposing
positions. 9 But, classical liberalism as well as civic humanism says
that this should be done. Classical liberalism, after all, calls for
competitive instincts to be steered into "markets." And markets, of
course, are where people advance their own interests by advancing the
interests of others. In addition, Deutsch argues that social institutions
should encourage full, open, honest, and mutually respectful
communication between conflicting parties.'o Again, however, classical
liberalism, as well as civic humanism, encourages such conduct. Finally,
Deutsch argues that social institutions should help people develop a
sophisticated awareness of the norms, rules, and procedures that are
available to support good faith negotiations and to deter dirty tricks,
refusals to negotiate, and exploitation."l Here Deutsch actually sounds
more like a classical liberal than a civic humanist.
147. Id. at 94.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. DEUTSCH, supra note 140, at 94.
151. Id. at 46-63.
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The foregoing reveals that once again the field of science, this
time the field of social science, provides little or no help in determining
whether human beings are, by nature, competitive and self-interested or
cooperative and altruistic. Thus, sadly, science itself seems unable to
provide assistance when it comes to deciding which of the two competing
systems of dispute resolution is more closely aligned with human nature.
VI. CONCLUSION
It would be easy to conclude this analysis by suggesting that non-
adversarial dispute resolution procedures will become even more important
as the twentieth century draws to a close. That clearly seems to be the
trend. Further, it would be easy to suggest that adversarial proceedings as
we know them might well be non-existent in the relatively near future.
These easy conclusions, however, might well be simply wrong.
This analysis began, it should be recalled, with a rather snide
comment about academic writing in the field of law. Academics should
perhaps follow Churchill's advice and take a nap, the analysis suggested,
rather than write yet another piece on the adversary system of justice.
Ironically, this analysis has now in a sense come full circle. It closes with
yet another reference to ideas of political leaders, ideas that, like
Churchill's, might not be comfortably received by trend-setting academics.
George Bush took great pleasure in announcing during his 1989
visit to Hungary that Marx's Das Kapital, the bible, so to speak, of the
modem version of civic humanism, is no longer required reading at
Budapest's Karl Marx University. Conversely, as one of Bush's national
security advisors coyly noted, that book is "still a major item at
Stanford."' These comments, of course, are consistent with another
joke frequently heard in political circles. Socialism's supporters, political
wags now often suggest, do not live behind the iron curtain. Rather, they
live on American college campuses.
The point of these references is this: Countless academics now
call for abolition of the adversary system of justice, a system that rests on
the tenets of classical liberalism, and for the triumph of an alternative
system of justice, a system that rests on the tenets of civic humanism.'
152. Fred Barnes, Holland Diarist, NEw REPUBuc, Aug. 7 & 14, 1989, at 42.
153. Interestingly, things are not necessarily quite this clear, even to the academic
involved. For example, near the end of Stephen Landsman's recent book about the adversary
system of justice, Landsman quotes Deborah Rhode, a frequent critic of that same system.
Rhode argues in the quoted excerpt that traditional arguments in support of the requirement
of lawyer confidentiality remain wholly unconvincing. Even the most fervent defenders of
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While these academics do this, however, people throughout the world who
have actually lived under political and social systems that rest on the ideas
closely related to those of civic humanism seem desperate to throw off
those systems and replace them with systems that rest on the principles of
classical liberalism.'
unqualified confidentiality, Rhode argues, do not for the most part pursue the logic of their
position when their own self interests are at issue. Thus, she notes, few defenders of the
requirement of confidentiality object to breaches of confidentiality if such breaches are
necessary for lawyers to collect their fees. Rhode then notes that "lilt is unclear why the
pecuniary interests of lawyers should assume priority over the potentially more significant
claims of third party victims." Actually, however, it is not at all unclear, at least to Rhode,
why lawyers should put their own interests over the interests of others. Lawyers, she says in
a quoted passage that ends Landsman's book, "will inevitably resolve doubts in expedient
directions." LANDSMAN, READINGS, supra note 2.
154. For two fascinating studies of recent changes in the former Soviet Union, both by
long established Soviet scholars, see generally JERRY F. HOUGH, RussIA AND THE WEST:
GORBACHEV AND THE POLrTcs OF REFORM (1988) and MIcHEL TATU, GORBACHEV:
L'URSS VA-T-ELL CHANGER? (1988).
Not surprisingly, lawyers resolve disputes in socialist societies in ways very
different than those used by societies that employ the adversary system of justice. See
generally Justice Robert F. Utter, Dispute Resolution in China, 62 WAsH. L. REv. 383
(1987); see also Donald D. Barry & Harold J. Berman, The Soviet Legal Profession, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1968); Christopher C. Osakawe, The Public Interest and the Role of the
Procurator in Soviet Civil Litigation: A Critical Analysis, 18 TEx. INT'L LJ. 37 (1983).
Professors Barry and Berman note, for example, that the idea of "advokatura" was not
introduced into Russia until the mid-nineteenth century. They suggest that the revolution
should have changed all that.
There is nothing in Marxist theory or in the spirit of Bolshevism which
explains the utility for a socialist society of preserving the office of the
professional legal representative, whose task is to present his client's
cause in the best possible light and not to pass judgment on the claims
or defenses or on the client himself. Indeed, from a Marxist-Leninist
standpoint the lawyer's role appears especially dubious when he is
defense counsel in a criminal case: the client has been charged by a
responsible state official with the commission of an offense against
society....
Barry & Berman, supra, at 11-12. Professor Osakawe suggests that the legal system
presently used in the Soviet Union is in fact a blend of the adversary system of England and
the United States and the inquisitorial system of continental Europe.
In the United States, lawyers resolve disputes while primarily working in a system
resting upon the same model as that employed in American politics and economics. That
model is, or at least was until the early part of the twentieth century, a model resting on the
tenets of classical liberalism. Conversely, in socialist countries, lawyers resolve disputes
while primarily working in a system resting on the same model as that employed in politics
and economics in those countries. The model in those countries was, at least until the last
few years, a model that built on the tenets of civic humanism.
